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UNRAVELING IN ASSIGNMENT MARKETS
ABSTRACT
We present a two-period model of the assignment market with uncertainty in the first period
regarding productive characteristics of participants. This model is used to understand incentives
toward early contracts or unraveling in labor markets for entry-level professionals. We study two
contractual situations, one where firms are bound by ex post unsuccessful early contracts, and the
other where they can buy out of unsuccessful early contracts. The economic benefit of unraveling
is to provide insurance in the absence of complete markets, but it can come at the cost of inefficient
assignments. Without reentry, unraveling need not occur. It is more likely, the smaller the applicant
pool or the proportion of more promising applicants in the pool, and the greater the degree of
heterogeneity in the pool. A ban on early contracts always hurts firms and benefits less promising
applicants, but the welfare effects on more promising applicants depends on how the gains from
early contracts are shared. With buyouts, inefficiencies in assignments are eliminated, and
unraveling always occurs between firms and the more promising applicants. The efficiency gains













The timing of transactions is important in markets where buyers and sellers need to be
matched to each other. There are many examples. Elite colleges have both re~lar and
early admission programs. Most graduate and mdergraduate admission procedures agree
not to inform applicants prior to a common date. Yew entrants into many professional
spores competitions choose when to expose themselves to the draft. Much attention lately
h= been focused on the trend toward recruiting younger and less experienced players in
recent National Basketball Association drafts. This year the NBA draft set a record in that
the first 7 picks and 17 song 29 fist-round selections were not college seniors. Relative
to previous years, it is mtonishing that the 13th-ranked, l?-year old Kobe Bryat skipped
college altogether. In spite of the posturing by NBA executives urging players to stay in
school ad finish their education, this year’s outcome is likely to signal a long term trend
toward earlier entrance into the NBA.
Difficulties in controlling the timing of recruiting new entrants of highly trtined pro-
fessionals have been pointed out in a set of interesting papers by Roth [1984,1991], and
Mongell and Roth [1991]. Roth and Xing [1994] observe that these difficulties appem in
many other markets, including the medied weekly markets for ordinmy commodi~ies.
medical interns md residents, and postseason college football bowl games.
Two related aspects of timing of market transactions must be distinguished. In one,
labeled “jumping the gtm” by Roth and Xing, participants compete for a limited supply
of the best-qualified candidates or best positions in timing their bids ~d accept mces. For
inst mce, tis sometimes make exploding offers which expire within a very short time,
and job candidates often try to delay making a choice from atilable offers in the hope of
receiving better ones. The second aspect of timing is uraveling of the appointment date.
In entry-level professional labor markets, employment begins only after graduation and
attainment of professional qurdificacions, but the appointment date sometimes unravels
to a few years before that. Umaveling of the appointment date may take the form of
signing employment contracts long before employment is to begin, N in the placement
of medical interns and residents before 1947, or it may be in the form of summer job
-1-progrruns of law students prior to offers of longer term positions upon graduation w is
happening in law fires today. Since in many situations there are natural dates when the
potential of candidates cm be ~sessed and appointments can be made, unraveling of the
appointment date is not so much about competing through the timing of proposing ~d
accepting offers, u about the inefficiencies of early contracts due to incomplete information
of d participants concerning the productive characteristics of the candidates.
These two aspects of maket timing problems me clearly related. Sometimes jumping
the gun can be the principal resson for unraveling of the appointment date. Still, isolating
the unraveling =pect from the jumping-the-gun =pect helps us understand what features
of the market imperfections are responsible for the timing problems. It also enables a
more accurate msessment of the social cost and benefit of early contracting, m well u the
welfme effects on different groups of participants.
We analyze the determinmts of market unraveling in what follows. The model is built
upon incomplete information about agents’ futwe productive characteristics. This creates
both individual uncertainty about one’s trtits as well as aggregate uncertainty about the
maket value of those trtits. Aggregate uncertainty tises in these mwket because of indi-
visible (pair-wise) assignments. If all appointments are made after individual uncertainty
is resolved, efficiency of assignments is guaranteed. but all agents are exposed to payoff
risks that they can be on the long or short side of the market. Complete .Arrow-Debreu
securities m~kets would eliminate payoff risks to agents. - we~ as guaratee efficient job
usignments. However, in the absence of such markets, unraveling or early contracting can
bring about limited insurance gains at the expense of inefficient assignments. Unraveling
is a mtifestation of risk aversion under incomplete insurance markets which relieve some
of the anxiety about the availability of job positions and qualified applications,
We analyze markets where individurd uncertainty applies only to job applicants, noc
to 6rms, and consider two contractual situations, one where 6rrns are bound by ex post
unsuccessful early cent racts, and snot her where buyouts by firms are allowed.
Without buyouts, unraveling need not occur. It is more likely the smaller the propor-
tion of more promising cadidates in the applicant pool ad the smaller the total applicant
pool relative to the number of positions. The absence of individual uncertainty for firms
-2-implies that payoff risks to & are the main source of insurance gains from early con-
tracts. These gains are large when the applicant pool or proportion of promising applicants
are small, because firms are less likely to fll their positions in the spot market. The de-
gree of heterogeneity in the applicant pool cm have ambiguous effects on the likelihood of
unraveling, because it tiects both the average quality of the applicmt pool = well M the
size of insurance gains. A ‘{compensated” increase in the degree of heterogeneity increwes
the likelihood of unraveling for the more promising applicants. In this model, unra~-cling
always reduces the probability that productive applicants will be short and firms will be
long in the spot market. Therefore a ban on early contracts always decre~es the ex ante
welfue of fires. The welfare effects on applicants depends on how the gains from early
contracting are shared. Since less promising applicants never receive my rents from early
contracts, the ban un=biguously improves their welfare. Whether the ban increases or
decre-s the welfare of more promising applicants depends on the size of che gains they
receive,
When buyouts of ex post unsuccessful early contracts are allowed, unraveling of firms
and more promising applicants always occurs. Some less promising applicants also sign
early contracts if the number of more promising applicants is smaller than the number of
positiom. Buyouts are Pareto optimal for all market participants m a whole because they
eliminate inefficient assignments and incre=e total gains from trade. Buyouts unambigu-
ously increase the welfare of less promising candidates. In many situations they benefit all
parties, but ex~ples ca be constructed where buyouts benefit applicants at the expense
of h. Sometimes prohibitions on buyouts may be in the interests of firms.
This paper is orgtized ~ foUows. Ln the next section, we introduce a two-period as-
signment model ad use a simple example to define individual and aggregate uncertainties
that are central to analysis of ursraveling. We also identify the market imperfections that
cause unraveling. Section 3 malyzes how unraveling occurs as a competitive equilibrium
without buyouts, and section 4 considers comparative statics issues reg~dlng the relative
size and composition of the applicant pool and the degree of heterogeneity in the pool.
In section 5 we consider maveling when buyouts are allowed. The last section is a brief
discussion on how to extend the model to more general setups. Proofs of pure technical
nature can be found in the appendix.
-3-2. The Assignment Market: Background
There me two models of mukets where matching considerations are crucial: the s.ssign-
ment market of Koopmans and Beckmm [1953] md Shapley and Shubik [1972], and the
marriage mmket of Gale and Shapley [1962]. These two markets differ from most others
in that the objects of trade rue indivisible. Each participant h= ody one unit to buy or
sell. L The difference between the two mmkets is that in the assignment msrket money
is transferable mong all participants, while in the m=iage market only rank orderings
of preferences matter. 2 Since we emphasize the role of mmket and mmket prices, we
choose the assignment mmket = the hamework. In this section we review the setup of
the assignment market, illustrate the role of uncertainty, and present a simple example of
how unraveling ca occur when markets are incomplete.
2.1. Competitive equilibrium in the assignment market
Formally, the assignment market can be described as follows. There are two groups of
agents, ,W and W. There is a production function for each pair of agents such that the
joint output of m assignment of an A4 agent and a W agent is non-negative, and the joint
output of assigning either two M agents or two W agents to each other is zero. The output
of an unassigned agent is normalized to zero, The largest total output of any number of
agents is the maximal su of outputs that can be produced by pair-wise msignments of
these agents.
A pair-wise assignment is feasible if each agent is matched to at most one other agent.
Associated with a femible =signment is a feasible outcome, a vector of non-negative payoffs
to the agents such that the sum of the payoffs for each matched pair is no greater than the
joint output of the pair and the payoff for each unmatched agent is zero. An assignment
is efficient if song all feasible assignments it yields the Imgest sum of joint outputs, or
equitiently, the Imgest sum of payoffs. A feasible outcome is stable if the sum of the
‘ More generally, the matching or ~ignment can be one-to-many, in which c= buyers have a fixed.
integer-valued demand.
2 For a discu=ion of the modeling issue in the two markets, see Crawford [1991]
-4-payoffs to each pair of agents is greater than or equal to the joint output they can produce.
Thus, in a stable outcome, the sum of payoffs equals the joint output for each matched
pair. For each unmatched ptir, the sum of payoffs for the two agents is greater than the
joint output they cm produce, so that the pair does not form a “blocking” coalition cha~
improves the payoffs for both of them.
The main resdt in the theory of wsignment m~kets is that if a feasible outcome is
stable then the msociated =signcnent is efficient, and if a fe=ible assigment is efficient
then there exists a feasible outcome associated with it that is stable. This is analogous to
the fist and second welfae theorem in a decentralized economy. Koopmans and Beckmm
[1953] formulate the efficient assignment m a solution to a linear programming problem and
give a competitive market equilibrium interpretation to the associated outcome. Shapley
and Shubik [1972] formulate stable outcomes as equilibria of a cooperative game and show
that side-payments. do not occu in equilibrium. In this paper, we refer to each stable
outcome ss a competitive equilibrium.
2.2. Payoff risks
The custom~ level of abstraction of the =signment theory conceals its connections with
more familiar market malysis. The parallels are best revealed by analyzing a situation
where there are two distinct types of identical agents in each group. Let JM1md .Yfz denote
the two types of .M agents of sizes ml and mz. Similarly, WI and W2 are the two types
of W agents of sizes WI ad W2. .4ssume that Ivfl agents ue more productive than IM2
agents, md similarly for the two types in W. To simplify further, =sume that msignment
of an JM, agent to a WI agent produces unit output and all other kinds of assignments
produce notbng. 3
It is useti to think of one group of agents u residual income recipients, say W,
to put the msignment market in a competitive framework. In this example W2 agents
are not productive and c=ot bid positive prices for either type of M agents. They
receive a payoff of zero in the market. Similarly, M2 agents carmot ~k positive prices of
3 In the IUt s=tlon, we COm,der ~slgnment markets with more genera] 5peClficati0ns OfJoint OutPuts
-5-any type of W agents and receive zero payoff. Only .bf, and WI agents potentially have
positive payoffs. Their actual payoffs in a competitive market depend on ml and WI. For
exmple, if ml = UJl, it is possible to match each .Yll agent \vith a W, agent, The unit
output produced by such a match must be divided between the two agents. Any division
that gives productive agents in each group the same non-negative payoff is a competitive
equilibrium when ml = WI. Suppose, however, that ml > WI. Now the supply of ~Wl
agents exceeds demmd md their payoff is driven down to zero. W, agents get all the
return because they me the scace factor. If ml < WI then JMI agents rue the scarce factor
and receive 1 in the competitive equilibrium.
The discontinuities in equilibrium prices or payoffs with respect to supply and demand
are inherent in the indivisibility of sssigmnents (paimise here) and in the discreteness in
the types. Indivisibility implies that payoffs are sensitive only to the sign of excess demand
or supply, not to its magnitude. Whether ml exceeds W1 by a few or by many does not
change the equilibrium payoffs of zero for :Ml agents and 1 for W1 agents. The discontinuity
does not disappear = the size of the market gets large.
The discontinuity is more sensitive to the discreteness of types. For example, suppose
the joint output between less and more productive agents of each group is v E (O, 1/2),
instead of O. Then the consequences of being on the long or short side of the market rue
less severe. If ml > WI but ml < W1 + UJZso that d .}11 agents me matched to the two
types of W agents, their equilibrium payoff is u instead of zero because they add tiue
u to ~signments with W2 agents. W, agents receive 1 – v instead of 1. In the limit of
a continuum of types, the discontinuity disappears. In our simple model of two types of
each group, the uncertainty about the relative size of the two productive types translates
into payoff risks before they enter the m~ket. Avoiding this kind of payoff risks is a main
motintion for individual agents to contract early and “mavel” the mmket. 4
4 Roth and Xing [1994] identify two other ca~ of unraveling in a tw~period model of the ~signment
market. One is instability: [f the assignment in the -end period is unstable, then there may be incentives
for agents to resch agreemenh early. However, this cannot happen in a competitive -ignment market,
They identify marketcompetition M another cawe of unravelingand give an example where desplce the
stability of =ignrnent in the second period, some agents have incentivm to deviate and make offers in the
Iimt ~riod to their next best candldat~ by committing to not competing for these agents in c=e they
reject the offem.
-6-2.3. An example of unraveling
The essential =pects of mruket unraveling are illustrated by a two period model in which
there is both individual uncertainty and aggregate uncertainty. Individual uncertainty
is incomplete information in the fist period by all agents of how productive a particulw
agent will be in the wcond period. Individual mcertainty creates rmdornness in supplies of
different types of agents, and resdts in aggregate uncertainty in the form of discontinuous
equilibrium payoffs. Both types of uncertainty are necessary to capt~e the essence of
unraveling. L-ruaveling (fist period contracting) eliminates aggregate mcertainty but at
the costs of inefficient assignments when there is individual uncertainty. Contracting after
individual uncertainty is resolved ensures efficient assignments, but exposes agents to payoff
risks due to aggregate mcertainty.
These points can be illustrated by extending the above example. In the second period
there are productive and unproductive agents in JW and W u above. In the first period
the productivities of the agents within each group .M and W are unknown. Instead, each
agent has probability A of becoming productive in the second period. We use superscripts
for period and subscripts for t~e. For example, JW: denotes the productive -M agents in
the second period, with size rn~. All agents are risk-averse with utility function u. For
simplicity, we assume that there are equal numbers of :M and W agents.
The second period competitive equilibrium gives productive agents a payoff of 1 or
O depending on excess dem=d or supply. It is indetetinate if there ue equal numbers
of productive agents. We assume that when my = w;, the equilibria payoff to all JM;
agents is Oor 1 tith probability 1/2. This assumption is non-consequential for what follows,
When n is sficiently l~ge, the probability that mz – ~ — ~~ in the second period becomes
arbitrarily small. Since we are interested in ~signment markets with lage numbers of
psuticipmts, the event m; = w; is irrelevat.
The uncertainty of second period payoffs may motiwte agents to contract with each
other in the bst period, before their productivity is known. Imagine the following grune.
In the first period, there are random pair-wise meetings between M’ agents and W1 agents,
Each pair of agents chooses whether to sign a contract in which the ~W’ agent receives payoff
r and the W1 agent receives 1–r in the second period if both turn out to be productive, and
-7-Ootherwise. The second period market is said to unravel if there exists some r 6 [0, 1] such
that some pairs of agents choose to sign the first period contract rather than to Ivait. From
the social point of view, the contracts create assignment inefficiencies because information
necessary to achieve efficient ~signments is atilable only in the second period. From the
individud point of view, signing the fist period contract eliminates payoff risks that the
two agents may be on the long or short side of the market, should they be produc~ive,
but it also incre~es payoff risks due to individual uncertainty, because the payoff horn the
contract depends on the joint probability that both ae productive,
When A is sticiently large the insurmce gains from contracting early and eliminat-
ing aggregate uncertainty outweigh the additional individual mcertainty it creates, The
mmket unravels. The argument runs as follows. In the second period, the payoffs to
productive agents are 1 or O depending on excess demand. The expected utility to each
agent from waiting is A[u(l)/2 + u(0)/2] + (1 — J)u(0). If two agents sign the”fist period
contract the expected utility to the Ml agent is Azu(r) + (1 – A2)u(0) and the expected
utility to the WI agent is A2U(1 – r) + (1 – ~2)u(0). Let rm be the minimum payoff re-
quired for !Ml agents to sign the contract and rw be the maximum payoff that IV1 agents
~e willing to pay JM1 agents to sign the contract. Equating the expressions abo~~ewe
have that the ask price rm and the bid price r“ are implicitly defied by the condition
u(rm) = u(1 — rw) = u(0) + [u(l) — up]/. If A is lmge enough then the ~k price
rm falls below the bid price rw and unraveling occurs. There is not enough structure in
this example to determine the mmket equilibrium price r uniquely, but it must be between
the bid and ~k. When A is sficiently small, r“ < rm and the mmket does not unravel:
The value of insurace born a tit period contract is small because the probability of
exposure to aggregate uncertainty in the second period is smd. The additional individual
mcertainty dominates the insurance gains.
2.4. Unraveling and market incompleteness
Complete snalysis of richer ~signment problems is presented the following sections, Before
we go on, it is important to understand that the existence and inefficiency of uraveling is
-8-caused by market incompleteness. In the above example, the optimal insurance arrange-
ment is for all agents to sign a fist period contract in which they all receive the same share
of maximum total joint output after waiting till the second period to achieve efficient as-
signments. An Arrow- Debreu securities market together with a second period spot market
is the decentrtized mechmism that achieves this.
Imagine that in the 6.rst period each agent sells 100 perfectly divisible shaes of the
claim to the agent’s payoff from the second period spot market. For example, holding
50 shares of one claim entitles the buyer to 1/2 of the seller’s equilibria payoff from
the spot mmket. A competitive equilibrium in the securities market is the set of share
prices that equates the supply and demand for shines of all claims. Given these prices,
each agent purchases the numbers of shares that m=imize expected utility subject to the
budget constraint, and the market clems for shares of each claim. Since all agents are
indistinguishable in the fist period the competitive equilibrium has equal share prices for
all claims and each agent holds an equal number of shares of each claim, including the
agent’s O- claim. This equi~bri~ is optim~ ex POSC!beca~e the second period spot
market produces the efficient ~signment with mtimal total output. It is also optimal ex
ante, because each agent spreads risks as much w possible.
If markets were complete and agents codd legally sell claims to their future payoffs,
the empirical phenomena ~sociated with unraveling would not exist. Unraveling and emly,
inefficient contracting is a manifestation of market failure. Unraveling is never said to be
observed in mmkets where futures contracts rue common, such as agricultural commodities.
Rather, it is restricted to those labor markets where indivisible assignments are importmt
and where complete markets of the kind described above are legally prohibited as too
restrictive on permns for other reasons. In what follows we take it for granted that complete
markets do not exist, so that unraveling may occur.
3. Unraveling without Reentry
In this section, we consider a richer version of the example above. There agents are
indistinguishable in the first period and unraveling affects all market participants in the
-9-sme way. Here we allow for two kinds of heterogeneity among participants. First, the
two groups of participants in the ~signment market are not symmetric in terms of their
individual uncertainty. In labor market for entry-level professionals, individual uncertainty
about future productivity is a substantial issue only for the potential candidates. Firms
have operated in the m~ket for a long time and have established reputations. Second, there
is heterogeneity within each group of agents. Some are more likely to become productive
later than others in the same group. Unraveling in this situation can affect different
types of agents in one group differently. The simplest model that captures these kinds of
heterogeneity in ~sigment markets is described next, ud the competitive equilibrium
in the fust period mmket is characterized. Ln this section we msurne that agents who
sign fist period contracts do not enter the spot market in the second period. The case of
unraveling with buyouts and reentry is considered in the next section.
3.1. The model
.ks before, in the second period there ae two types of agents in each group, productive and
unproductive, denoted ss .W? and JM;, and W; and Wf. The joint product is 1 between
JM: md W; agents and O othenvise. Now, there are two different types of agents in each
group in the first period, type 1 and type 2, who face different individual uncertainty. For
1 have probability Ji of becoming productive in the each i = 1, 2. .M} agents, of size mi,
second period, md probability 1 – J, of becoming unproductive. We assume that Al > A2
so that JM; agents ue the more promising job cadidates. To capture the idea that fires
face little uncertainty about their own types, we assume that W/ agents, of size w!, have
probability 1 of becoming productive, and that type 2 W agents have probability 1 of
becoming unproductive. Both types of JM agents have the same concave utility function u
over payoffs, and both types of W agents have the sme utility function v.
We look for an equilibrium where both the terms of fist period contracts and the
number of each type of agents who sign them rue endogenous. For agents who choose to
wait, the equilibrium in the second period spot mmket is described = before: Productive
agents receive a payoff of 1 if they are on the short side of the market and all other agents
receive zero. Since there is no reentry, the fist period contract between an kf,~ agent
-1o-(i = 1,2) and a type 1 W agent takes the following form: .Any .Jf} agent who turns out
to be productive receives r, and the W; agent receives 1 – ri; otherwise both receive zero,
We refer to ri s-s the price of the first period contract with :M~ agents.
Since type 2 W agents are known to be unproductive, first period contracts are only
between the two types of ,M agents ad type 1 W agents. Again, we proceed by defining
bid and ask prices for the M agents. There are two complications: Different types may
have different bid and =k prices, and these prices depend on the number yi of .W; agents
who sign fist period contracts. Ask and bid prices depend on yl and Y2 because aggregate
uncertainty, the discontinuous payoffs in the second period spot muket condition on
excess demand and supply, depends on yl and yz. For any yl and yz, let T(YI, yl ) be
the probability of the event ml s w;. That is, r(yl, V2) is the probability that ex post
productive M agents receive 1 in the second period spot market. 5
It represents the aggregate uncertainty. To shorten notation, \ve w-rite m instead of
T(YI, YZ) whenever the meaning is clear.
3.2. Bid and ask prices
For each m E [0. 1], in order for M; agents to be indifferent between signing a first period
contract at price ri and waiting until the second period spot market, we must have
(1 - Ai)U(0)+ AIU(rl) = (1 - At)U(0) + A1[~U(l) +(1 - T)U(O)].
This simplifies to
TU(l) + (1 – T)U(O) = U(rl),
Therefore, the ask price of M: agents is the sme as the ask price of .M; agents, Let rm(r)
denote the common uk price as a function of ~.
Ln order for W} agents to be in~erent between signing a fist period contract with
M; agents at price rl and wtiting for the second period spot mmket, we must have
(1 - ~)V(l) +iTU(0) = (1 - Ai)U(0) +Aiv(l -ri).
5 For simplicity, indeterminacy of the spot market equilibriumis resolved by our ~umption that
when m? = w;, tbe equilibrium is the same M when ml < w;.
-11-Let r~(r) denote the bid price for JV; agents. It is straightforward to show chat since
JI > Jz, r~(~) 2 r;(z) for all m, and the equality holds if and ody if r = 1.
Taking derivatives with respect to r,
drm(r) _ = u(1) – .(0) dr~(r) _ v(l) – u(o)
dn u’(rm(rr)) ‘ d~ A,u’(1–ry(m))”
Thus, the wk price TM(T) is incre~ing and convex, and the bid prices r:(z) and r;(r)
are increasing md concave. It is straightforward to check that r“’(0) = O, r~(l – A,) = O,
and rm(l) = r:(l) = 1for i = 1,2,
In Figure 1, r m intersects r: at iTl c (O, 1) and it intersects r; at %2 G (r, , I),
rm(n) > r~(ir) > r;(m) for ~ c [O,TI), r~(n) > rm(rr) > r~(~) for r E (ml, rz), and
rf(~) > r;(~) > rm(~) for ~ G (T21 1). Therefore, above Z2 insmance gains exist from
fist period contracts with W; agents for both type 1 and type 2 IV agents, Between rl
and ~z insurance gains exist for type 1 <M agents but not for type 2 JM agents. Below Z,
the ~k price exceeds both bid prices so there is no gain from insurance. That insurance
gains exist ordy when r is high is due to the absence of individual uncertainty for W}
agents, When r is very low, the ssk price of both types of .M agents is close to zero, buc
because of theindividual uncertainty of the M agents, the bidpnce for each type of :M
agent is negative: W; agents prefer wtiting for the spot market to signing first period
contracts with either type of JM agents at my price. An interpretation of this result is
that payoff risks to firms are the main source of insurance gains in our model,
Twoother cofigurations of bidand~k functions arepossible. Itcan happen that the
askpnce odyintersects the bidprice function for~M/ agents mdliesentirely above the bid
price for ,M~ agents for all r <1. Then JM; agents never participate in unraveling. It can
also happen that the three curves intersect orslyat r=l. Here the~kpnce function lies
above both bid price functions for any ~ < 1 md there is no possible gain from insurance,
Wch c=e occurs depends on the curvatures of r“ mdr~, andon the probabilities Al and
AZ ifu sndu are concave. Thecurnturesof r”’ and rw in turn depend on risk aversion.
If both u and o me linear (risk neutral), drm/dn = 1 md dr~/dr = A,: There are no
gains from firscperiod contracts regsrdlessof~l and~z. The more risk averse the agents,
the more likely are insurance gains. If u andu are concave, larger Ji causes the bid price
-12-function for .}f~ agents to shift up, and insurance gains ue more likely to exist. In what
follows, we incorporate all cases by considering the c~e shown in Figure 1, with Yz and
rl set to 1 if they do not exist,
3.3. Ordering property and monotonicity property
To define the mruket equilibrium, it is useful to think of the first period market as an
assignment market. If sn A4,1 agent si~ a first period contract with a W/ agent. they
are said to be resigned to each other. If m agent chooses to wait until the second period
mmket, the agent is said to be rm~signed. In a “pure” msigmnent problem the payoff
from not being unassigned is exogenous. Here it depends on yl =d yz because these
numbers affect the aggregate uncertainty in the wcond period spot market. But these are
endogenous variables, determined by the fist period market equilibrium.
Unraveling is identified with signing a tirst period contract. Different kinds of unrav-
eling ue possible because there can be many comer so[utions in this problem. LTnraveling
of ~M,l agents occurs if the bid price exceeds the ask price at some y, > 0. The mmket
equilibrium price rl lies between the bid and ask. Unraveling of .M~ agents is complete if
all :M: agents sign a first period contract, so that ~i = m:, Unraveling is incomplete if
y, < m;. In this cme all M; agents must be indifferent between signing and waiting for the
second period spot mmket. For unraveling of W; agents to occur, the bid price for at least
one type of .M agents must exceed the mk price at the corresponding VI and yz such that
VI + Y2 > IJ. ~g~nt the eq~fibri~ price ri must fall in between. If Y1 + YZ = w;, there is
complete unraveling for W/ agents. In this case, if both y, and yz are positive, W} agents
must be indifferent between signing 6rst period contracts with .M{ agents and with ~M~
agents. H yl + yz < w; there is incomplete unraveling for W; agents, and vi > 0 implies
that W/ agents are indifferent between signing fit period contracts with iM# agents and
waiting for the second period spot market.
Two properties of the model greatly simplify the chmacterization of market equil.ib-
riurn. First, unraveling is ordered: Unraveling of Jf/ agents precedes that of ;lf~ agents.
This ordering property limits the number of comer solutions that must be considered,
-13-Second, the probability ~(gl, YZ) is monotonically decreasing in its arguments. This mono-
tonicity property simplifies the calcdation of equilibrium, given the initial conditions of
the problem,
The greater probability of becoming productive for type 1 .Vf agents than for type 2
M agents implies that the bid price for ,Ml agents is greater than the bid price for .Lf~
agents for sny iT < 1. Since the ask price for the two types is the same, any unraveling of
i~j agents implies complete unraveling of JM/ agents. This result can be proven as follows,
Assuming unraveling for M; agents, we have rm (r) < rz. If there is incomplete unraveling
for .M/ agents, we have rm(r) = rl. It follows that rl s rz. Since Al > AZ,
(1 - A,)v(0) + AIU(l -r, ) > (1 - A,)u(0) +A~u(l–r,).
Thus, W; agents strictly prefer a first period contract with M; agents at price rl to a fist
period contract with JM~ agents at price rz, which is a contradiction because W} agents
must be indifferent between contracting with i~f and .Vl; agents if yl, yz > 0.
We now establish the monotorsicity property of r(yl, YZ). By definition, Z(YI, YZ) is
given by
“Y-”i [ici:-yl~f(’ -’1)’-’] [Scz-y,’:(’ -’z]’-’-’] 1
,=0 j=O k=O k=O
where C: = j !/(i!(j – i)!) is the binomial coefficient. Since yZ > 0 implies yl = m; we only
need to know how rr(yl, O) changes with yl for yl s m: and how iT(m~, yZ) changes with
Y2. The absence of individual uncertainty for W; agents implies that Z(Y1, 0) decreases
with yl for S.Uyl ~ m; ~d r(m~, yz) decremes with yz. In other words, the probability
of excess demand for productive JM agents in the second period spot market decreases as
more agents sign &t period contracts.
The reason cm be understood m follows. If an additional pair of M: and W; agents
signs a first period contract, the number of Wf agents remaining in the second period spot
market falls by one. Individual uncertainty for .W} agents means that the expected number
of M: agents participating in the second period mmket falls by less than one. Therefore
the probability that productive .M agents will be short in the second period spot market
-14-decreases with yl. More precisely, consider ~(yl – 1, O) and n(y] ,O) for anY YI < ml.
Applying the definition above,
fi(Yl – 1,0)
— —“f+’i [ici,-,,+l~:(’ -Al)’-’] [se::’~!(’ -J2)’-’-’]
,=0 ]=0 k=o k=o
=~(Yl lo).
A similar mgument shows that r(m~, yZ) decreases with yZ.
3.4. Market equilibria
Different kinds of equilibria me possible, depending on the relative number of each type.
.Issume for now that m; < w; < m; ‘+ m;. r(m~, O) is the probability that productive .M
agents will be on the short side of the second period spot market given that all ,M/ agents
sign first period contracts and no M; agents sign them. The ordering property implies
that the relation between this probability and ml and 72 in Figure 1 is critical, because
there is no unraveling for M; agents unless uraveling for M} is complete. Depending on
the location of n(m{, O) relative to T1 and mz, there ue three possible kinds of unraveling
equilibria.
(i) Complete unraveling of the more promising type. Suppose mz > n(m~, O) > nl. See
Figure 1. By the ordering property, unraveling of JV1~agents only occurs after complete
unraveling for JVf~agents, at r(m~, O). But there is no gain from insur~ce for M: agents
at or below that point because z(m~, O) < 72, ad by the monotonicity property, any
maveling of ~M~agents causes m to decrease further. Thus there is no unraveling for .Vf;
agents. Since T(O, O) > T(m; , O) > TI, unraveling for .Vf{ agents continues until all .V’j
-15-agents sign first period contracts with W} agents, The equilibrium T is iT(m~, O) > rl.
There is incomplete unraveling for W; agents, who are indifferent between signing first
period contracts with M: agents and waiting for the second period spot market, The
equilibrium price of the fist period contract is rl = r~(r(m], O)), on the bid function for
JM~agents. They receive a.Uthe rent born fist period contracts.
(ii) Incomplete or no unraveling of the promising type. Suppose n(m~, O) < ~1. Again,
since irl < mz, the ordering property md the monotonicity property imply that there is
no uravehg for JM~ agents. If n(O, O) < Tl there is no unraveling for ,ti/ agents either.
All agents wait for the second period spot market because there is no gtin from insurance
at or below r(O. O) and unraveling always reduces r. If T(O, O) > T1 there is incomplete
unraveling for type 1 iv agents. Unraveling continues until the equilibrium mis driven down
to ?r, 6 There is also incomplete unraveling for W/ agents. Both W} md M: agents
are indifferent between signing first period contracts with each other md waiting for the
second period spot mmket. The price of first period contracts is rl = rm(~l ) = r~(nl )
and all insur=ce gains are exhausted.
(iii) Unraveling of both types. Suppose T(m; , O) > irz. Here there ~e insurance gains
for iM~ agents after complete unraveling of JM~agents. There is incomplete unraveling of
M; agents. The equilibrium m occurs at 7r2, where all insurance gains for JM) agents are
exhausted. JM~ agents are indifferent between si~ng first period contracts and waiting
for the second period market, and the equilibrium price for fist period contracts with JV;
agents is r2 = rm(r2 ) = r~(rz). The equilibrium price of first period contracts with M;
agent5 is T1 = ry(rr2) > rm (rr2). iu~ agents extract all the rents from 6rst period contracts
with WI agents, and they strictly prefer signing first period contracts to waiting for the
second period spot market. Again there is incomplete umaveling for W; agents, and they
m indifferent between fist period contracts with ;}f/ and JM~agents md waiting for the
second period spot market.
For completeness, we d]scuss what happens when m; > w;. Then r(m~, O) is not
defined. Lf r(O, O) < r~ unraveling does not OCCU. ~ T(O, O) > ~1, there is incomplete
6 We ignore the integer problem and mume lhat yI can take real values, More rigorously we can
assume agents use mixed strategim in the sense that the probabdity of signing a fi~t period contract can
be any number btwen O and 1.
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:unraveling of type 1 !M agents. The equilibrium price of fist period contracts with type
1 JW agents is on the ask price function. Unraveling continues mtil either the insurance
gains of first period contracts between ,M{ agents and W; agents are exhausted at rl, or
until all W} agents sign fist period contracts. The second c=e cannot occur if the total
number of .M agents is sticiently large, because any single W} agent could almost cercainly
obtain the maximum utility u(1) by waiting for the second period spot mmkec when all
other W; agents sign fist period contracts. The equilibrium therefore has incomplete
umaveling of both type 1 M agents and type 1 W agents, and the equilibrium price is
r, = rm(m, ) = rW(rl). The less interesting case of ml + ml < w; can be similarly
addressed,
4. Unraveling with No Reentry: Comparative Statics
The chmacterization of equilibria in the last section allows us to address how changes in
relative numbers of different kinds of agents ad in the degree of heterogeneity in the fist
period mmket tiect the likelihood of different forms of unraveling, equilibrium prices and
welfare in terms of fist period expected utility.
It follows from the ordering property and the monotonicity property that ~he neces-
sary ~d sficient condition for uraveling of JMJ agents is n(O, O) > T,, and the necessmy
and su.fticient condition for unraveling f .M~ agents is ~(m~, O) > iT2. .4s mentioned pre-
viously, the fit period market is not a pure ~signment market because the payoffs from
being unassigned are endogenous. In a pue msigment market, eqdlbrium payoffs are
determined by relative numbers of different types of market participants up to a boundary
condition that the un~signed receive an exogenous payoff. Here, the “effective” numbers
of market participants, T(O, O) and z(m~, O) (relative to ml and rz ) replace the relative
nmbers m;, m; md w; as the determinants of equilibrium.
4.1. Relative numbers and unraveling
r, and rz do not depend on relative numbers of market participants, but T(O, O) and
~(m~, O) decre=e = the number of either M: or ;Jf) agents increues or as the number
-ii’ -of W} agents decreases. Therefore, unraveling of .Y1~and i~~ agents becomes less likely
as the relative supply of the two type of JM agents incremes. Furthermore. given the
total number of ,M/ and .M; agents, unraveling for both types is less likely the greater
the proportion of JM} agents, because a greater proportion of JM} agents decre=es both
T(O, O) and r(m~, O). An interpretation of these results is that early contracting is less
likely in assignment markets where firms expect to fill their positions in the spot market
and therefore face smaU payoff risks.
Whether the numbers of market participants tiects the equilibrium prices depends
on the kind of equilibrium that occurs. Relative nubem do not tiect the bid and ask
functions in Figure 1, so if the equilibrium involves incomplete unraveling of either ~M/ or
JMJagents, changes in the numbers of different types of market participmts on the margin
have no effect on prices and hence no effects on the expected utility of any type of agents.
However, if there is complete unraveling of JV; agents, changes in the numbers of
different types of market participants tiect the equilibrium price rl through r(m~, 0). An
incre~e in m;, m increase in m;, or a decrease in w! all have the sme effect of reducing
rl because they reduce r(m~, O). Also, given the total number of iv{ ad .M; agents, a
greater proportion of JMI agents decre~es the equilibrium price rl of fist period con~racts
for M: agents. Lneither case, the welfare of type 1 .lf agents decreases, and the welfare of
W; agents increases. The welfare of type 2 M agents falls because rm, the shadow price
of fist period contracts for type 2 M agents, decreases as the equilibrium ~ falls.
4.2. Heterogeneity and unraveling
Consider anincreasein Az that reduces heterogeneity among M agents. The bid fmction
r; shifts up, and the function r: remains mchanged. See Figure 2. Z2 decreases and
insurance gtins increase for M: agents. This tends to increase the likelihood of unraveling
for M; agents. But a greater AZ also decreases r(O, O) and ~(m~, O) because it increases
the average quality of JM agents. This tends to decrease the likelihood of unraveling for
both types of agents. Putting all these together, unraveling for type 1 M agents becomes
less likely, but we cannot say whether the likelihood of unraveling for type 2 .Yf agents
incre~es or decre~es without additional structure on preferences and other parameters.
-18-If there is incomplete unraveling or no unraveling of type 1 :Yf agents, the equilibrium
price r~ is unflected, and the expected utilities of dl market participmts me untiected by
a decrease in AZ. If there is complete unaveling of type 1 M agents, the equilibrium price
rl falls, either due to a smrdler r(m~, O) f there is no unraveling for type ~ .~f agents, Or
due to a smaller 7T2if incomplete unraveling of type 2 M agents occurs. In either case, the
welfare of type 1 M agents decreases, and the welfme of W; agents increases. The effect
on the shadow price r “’ if there is no unraveling of .Vlj agents, and on the equilibrium
price rz if there is unraveling of Mi agents, is ambiguous because AZ has increased but
equilibrium T has decre~ed. The effect on the welfare of type 2 ~M agents is therefore
ambiguous.
Less heterogeneity caused by a decrease in Al has different effects. The bid function
r: shifts down, ~L increases, and iTZremains unchanged. See Figure 3. T(0, O) incremes,
but r(m~, O) does not change because it does not depend on Al. There is no effect on the
likelihood of maveling for type 2 M agents, and the effects for type 1 are ambiguous,
If there is incomplete unraveling of type 1 M agents, the equilibrium price rl incre~es,
but the effect on their welfare is ambiguous because Al has decremed. The shadow price
rm of type 2 JM agents i.ncresses, ms.king them better off. W; agents are worse off, If
there is complete umaveling of type 1 M agents, the equilibrium price r~ decre~es due
to a downward shift of the bid price function r~(~), whether or not there is unraveling
of type 2 M agents. M; agents are worse off because both rl and Al are lower. There
is no change in either the shadow price rm if there is no unraveling of ~M~agents, or the
equilibrium price rz if there is umaveling of M; agents, and their welfare remains the
same. The welfare of W: agents does not &age either because the better terms of first
period contracts with type 1 M agents is offset by their decreased probability of being
productive.
Changes in Al and AZ considered above tiect the average quality of JVIagents differ-
ently, and &age both the initial conditions T(O, O) and ~(m~, O), md the critical values
ml snd 7r2. A “-compensated” decreme in the heterogeneity of M agents is a change in
both ~, and A2 that isolates the two effects. Consider decre~ing Al and increasing Jz so
that the initial condition x(O, O) remains unchanged, Since rl is increased by a smaller Al,
unraveling for .}1/ agents becomes less likely.
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We conclude this section by discussing the welfare effects of banning first period contract-
ing. Clearly, a ban h= no effects if T(O, O) ~ ml. If the ban is effective, we use the shadow
price of each type of agents evaluated at 7(O, O) m a index of welfare with the ban and
compme it to the price or shadow price in the relevat competitive equilibrium without the
ban. Since in any unraveling equilibrium type 2 M agents are indifferent between signing
a first-period contract md waiting for the second period spot market, and since unraveling
reduces the equilibrium m and hence rm, a ban on first period contracting unambiguously
benefits them. Similarly, since in any equilibrium W; agents are indifferent between sign-
ing a first-period contract with type 1 M agents and waiting for the second period spot
msrket, and since mraveling reduces the equilibrium r and hence the equilibrium price
rl, a ba on tirst period contracting unambiguously hurts them.
The welfare effects on type 1 M agents depend on what kind of equilibrium wodd
otherwise obtain without the bsn. If z(O, O) > rrl > r(m~, 0), the equilibrium due of
r is rrl s rr(O,O), md unraveling is incomplete for type 1 M agents. In this csse, a ban
incre=es the shadow price of M; agents and makes them better off. If m(m~, O) > rl, the
market equilibrium involves complete unraveling for type 1 M agents. The welfare effect
of banning 6rst period contracts on M; agents depends on the initial condition iT(O,0), If
this is large enough, the shadow price r“(T(O, O)) for .Vff agents with the ban is greater
than the competitive equilibrium price r~(r(rrs~, O)) without the ban. But if T(O, O) is
small so that rm(r(O, O)) < r~(r(m~, O)), the ban makes them worse off.
5. Unraveling with Reentry
First and second period inefficiencies are msociated with the contracts analyzed above.
Psirwise first period contracts cuot replicate the fu~ risk shuing implied by complete
cent ingent contracts. Ln addition, second period inefficiencies ae caused by the rest net ion
on reentry for those ex post productive agents whose fit period contracts prove unsuccess-
ful because their partners turn out to be unproductive. In this section we allow these ex
post productive agents to enter the second period spot market. This amounts to allowing
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W; agents to “buy out” of their first period contracts ex post, should the contracts prove
msuccessful. 7 First period inefficiencies remain, but all second period inefficiencies are
eliminated because all ex post unsuccessful first period ~signments ae dissolved.
5.1. Buyout provisions
Buyouts require analyzing the terms on which they are negotiated. If the JM~ agent
(i= 1,2) in a fist period contract with a W; agent turns out to be productive, the terms
set by the initial contract cannot be advmtageously renegotiated. For imtance, if the spot
market tmns out to be short on productive W agents and they receive a spot payoff 1,
the W: agent must pay the first period price of ri to the .M~ agent in order to enter the
spot market, which leaves them with exactly the same net payoffs from not buying out.
Similarly, there me no gains for the W; agent to buy out of an unsuccessful fist period
cent ract if the spot price for productive M agents is 1. Therefore, buyout occurs only
when the contract is unsuccessful and the spot price of productive :M agents is O.
Because agents participating in a first period contract -ticipate the possibility of
buyout, renegotiation amounts to an up front contingency clause in the contract which
specifies the terms and the m~ket circumstances of a buyout: The W agent pays the ex
post unproductive JM~ agent r’ to buy out of the contract when there is excess supply of
productive M agents in the spot maket. Since the joint gain from buyout is 1, the two
agents in the first period contract are in the same position m they would have been had
the M; agent been productive. It then follows that an optimal fist period contract shodd
share risks in the ssme wy: r’ = rl.
8
7 The rewn why W; agents buy out unsuccessful contracts here k that they have no individual
uncertainty: ex pt productive M agents who sign a first period contract are always efficiently mignd
to productive W agents. The buyout would be tw~sided if there w- indivldurd uncertainty for W: agents
= well ss for M agents.
E When the cmt of reentry is a number k E (O,1), insled of OIn this -tion and 1 in the previous
-tion, equilibrium first period cent-ts spec~ the division of the output 1 when the M} agent turns
out to be productive and of the output 1 - u when he is not productive but m; > w; in the spat market.
The payoff risks in the two contingence= must be optimally shared between the two agents in a first
period contrnct, Lemma A.3 in the appendx characterizes the form of timt period contracts, with 1 – k
replacing m. The analysis of unraveling in this c- of cmtly r=ntry is very similar to that in this section.
The only change is that insurance gaim may not exist when r is small because reentry is more likely and
the cc.st of reentry reducer the value of the first period insurance contract.
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The analysis of equilibrium unraveling with reentry proceeds as in the previous section, In
fact, the analysis is easier here because with buyout all ex post inefficient ~signmencs are
2 < rut is independent of the numbers of eliminated and the key probabilityy of the event ml _
JMJ and ,M; agents who sign 6rst period contracts with W; agents. Thus r is no longer
endogenous and this greatly simplifies the chmacterization of equilibrium unraveling. To
simplify notation, let TO = T(O, O) be the probability of the event tha~ m; ~ ~~ with
reentry.
As in the previous section, we lirst &macterize the bid and ~k functions rrn and r‘.
For any fixed n 6 [0, I] and i = 1,2, let r~(r) be the solution to the equation
(1 - A,) flU(0) +[1 - (1 - ~l)~]~(r) = A,TU(l) + (1- AjT)U(0),
md let r:(r) be the solution to the equation
(1 - ~,)ZV(0) + [1 ‘(1 - AI)7]U(1 - ,) = i?V(0)+(l - ~)?J(l)
Thus with reentry there =e two ask price functions u well w two bid price functions, one
for ed type of agents. The properties of these functions are established in the appendix
(Lemma Al). The key =pects rue: For either type of JVI agents, (i) the ask and bid price
functiom are increasing in rr, (ii) aak and bid prices equal zero at T = O and equal 1 at
z = 1, (iii) bid price is strictly greater than ask price for all m between O and 1. Therefore,
tike the previous section, insurance gains exist for all dues of r for both types of .Vf
agents. Figure 4 depicts the ask and bid price functions for type i M agents (i = 1, 2).
RecW that without reentry, =k prices me the same for both types of ,W agents snd
the bid price is higher for type 1 M agents, so the ~due of insurace is always greater for
type 1, and unraveling of M agents is ordered by type. Here, one can e~ily check that
because Al > AZ, both the bid and ask prices are larger for type 1 JW agents than for type
2 at each value of T. It is proven in the appendix (Lemma .4,2) that although type 2 ,}f
agents are willing to accept a lower price for first period contracts, the fact that Al > Jz
still implies that W; agents prefer to sign fist period contracts with type 1 ~bf agents at
-22-their ~k price r~(n) rather than with type 2 at r~(z) at any r. lVith this result, we can
show that any unraveling of type 2 M agents implies complete unraveling of type 1, so
that the order is preserved when buyout and reentry are permitted.
The argument is a-s follows. Unraveling of iWj agents implies that there is a price
TZ 2 r: [no) such that W: agents prefer a first period contract with a type z J}f agent at
r2 to waiting for the second period spot market. But since W; agen~s prefer to sign fist
period contracts with type 1 IM agents at r~(~o ) rather than with type 2 at r~ (TO), there
exists a price rl > r~ (mo) such that W{ agents prefer a first period contract with a type 1
M agent rather than with a type 2 JM agent at rz. But type 1 M agents dso prefer a fist
period contract at such rl to waiting for the second period spot mmket. Thus, there must
be maveling of type 1 M agents if there is umaveling of type 2 M agents. Moreover, the
unraveling of type 1 JM agents must be complete, because incomplete unraveling would
imply that r] = r~(ro ) and W} agents ue indifferent between signing with type 1 .Lf
,.
agents at rl ~d slgnmg with type 2 M agents at some rz z r~ (To), which we know is
impossible.
Since r is no longer endogenous, the fist period contract equilibrium can be thought of
u a pure =signment problem. The following chmacterization of equilibrium with reentry
follows immediately. There are two possible cases. g If w; < m{ so that W} agents
are in short supply in the 6rst period, the unique competitive equilibrium h= complete
unraveling for W: agents and incomplete on.raveling for type 1 M agents at their ask price
rlm(~o). There is no unraveling for type 2 JM agents. If mj < w; < ml + m: so that type
1 JM agents rue short in the tirst period, the unique competitive equilibrium has complete
unraveling for type 1 M agents and for W: agents, and incomplete unraveling for type
2 M agents. The equilibrium price for type 2 M agents is their ask price rf(To). The
equilibrium price rl for type 1 .M agents is given by the following indifference condi tion
by W; agents:
(l-~, )irou(0) +[l-(l-Al)rro]v(l -r,) =(1 -A,)~Ou(0) +[1-(1- ~2)7rO]u(l -r~(TO)).
9 The 1- interesting csss of w; > ml + m; is ignorsd
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Unraveling without buyouts and reentry is both ex ante and ex post inefficient. Unraveling
with buyouts and reentry provide hmited insurance in the tirst period without affecting
the efficiency of assignments. Therefore compared to a situation where first period con-
tracting is prohibited, unraveling with free reentry generally improves welfare of market
participants. Ln particular, if W! agents are short in the first period market (w; < m;),
banning first period contracts decreaaes their welfme without changing the welfare of either
type of JM agents. Lf type 1 ,M agents me short (ml < w;), banning first period contracts
decreases their welfare s-s well m the welfsre of W} agents wit bout affecting the welfare of
type 2 IW agents.
It is dso of interest to compme welfare with and without reentry. In general reentry
must improve welfme, but there is a question of the distributions of the gains mong
various types of agents. It is possible that some agents become worse off with reent~.
Reentry causes both bid price functiom to shift up (because W: agents me willing to pay
more for tirst period contracts tith either type of .M agents at any r), and the ask price
function to shift down (because .M agents of either type me willing to accept less to sign
first period contracts at my r) and become two ask fmctions.
It is straightfowsrd to show that reentry generally benefits M; agents, With or
without reentry, in an unraveling equilibrium .M~ agents me indifferent between signing
and not signing first period contracts tith W{ agents. In either cue the welfare of JM;
agents is negatively related to the equilibrium m. Since without reentry the equilibrium
r is smaller thm T(O, O), and since with reentry the equilibrium iT always equals 7(O, O),
M; are better off with reent~. Of course, if in the equilibrium without reentry there is no
unraveling of any type, reentry does not change their welfme.
Welfare compmisons for ~M/ and W; agents are more complicated. If there is no
unraveling of rmy type without reentry, then doting reentry makes W/ agents better
off ad leaves JM/ either indifferent or better off. With reentry, the equilibrium either
involves incomplete unraveling of lMI agents when W/ are in short supply in the first
period, or complete unraveling of JM; agents when they are in short supply, In the tirst
c~e (w; < m; ), reentry does not change the welfare of type 1 M agents, because it does
-24-not &ange the equilibrium ~ md type 1 IW agents are indifferent between signing fist
period contracts with W} agents and waiting, with and without reentry. The equilibrium
price with reentry r~(~o ) is lower thm the shadow price rm (m(O, O)) without reentry, and
reentry allows W; agents to reap all the efficiency gains of better insurance, because In
the second case (m; < w;) reentry makes both .M~ agents ud W/ agents better off In
the equilibrium with reentry M} agents prefer a first period contract at the equilibrium rl
to w~ting ~d obtaining a shadow payoff r~(iro ), and w; agents get an equilibrium price
rzm(~o) from fist period contracts with type 2 JW agents, lower thm the shadow price
rY(~(O, O)) without reentry.
If there is incomplete unraveling of type 1 .M agents without reentry, allowing reentry
improves the welfme of lM} agents. This is because in the equilibrium without reentry
type 1 iU agents are indifferent between signing a first period contract and waiting for the
spot mruket at fil, but in the equilibrium with reentry they weakly prefer the equilibrium
contract with W; agents at To > TI. But the welf~e effect on W; agents is ambiguom
in this c=e: W} cm be either worse off or better off with reentry. H irl is sufficiently
small relative to To, W; agents are able to sign 6rst period contracts with JM} agents at a
very low price rm (rrl ) in the unraveling equilibrium without reentry, and allowing reentry
makes them worse off. This can happen when the risk- aversion of JM~ agents is great for
low values of z so that the ~k price function without reentry is ve~ convex. In this case,
irl c= be very small because M: agents are willing to accept very unfavorable terms in
first period contracts with W; agents when T is low.
6. Extension
In concluding this paper, we briefly describe how the model can be extended to more
general assignment markets. Let us consider the caae of a general symmetric 2 x 2 matrix
of joint outputs. Suppose that in the second period an asignment of two unproductive
agents of opposite groups produces VI and an assignment of a productive agent and an
unproductive agent of the opposite group produces Vz. The output of two productive
agents of opposite groups is still 1. We resume that VI s Uzand V2 ~ 1 so that one type of
-25-either group (JVf~and W; agents) is more productive that type 2 of the same .~oup (J}f;
and W: agents), and that 2V2 < 1 + VI so that productive agents of opposite groups ~e
optimally assigned to each other whenever possible. .issume that reentry is not allowed,
and the individual uncertainty for each type of agents is the same as before.
Now the equilibrium payoffs of ptiicipants in the second period market are not simply
characterized ~ 1 or O depending on relative numbers of the ex post productive agents,
Recall that the payoff from being un=signed in the second period is sssomed to be O. This
boundary payoff is not sufficient to pin down the equilibria payoffs if the two groups
have exactly the sme size because it is possible to sssign all agents to each other and
10 ~ order to solve the problem of indeterminacy, ‘e rents can be distributed differently,
distinguish two cases: over-supply of W agents (m; + m; < w; + UJ~), ~cl over-supply
of M agents (m; + m; > w{ + w;). We consider the first c~e only, the second case
cm be dealt with similarly. If m; + m; < W; + W;, then regmdless of the nubers of
different types of agents who sign fist period contracts, W agents are over-supplied in
the second period spot maket, so that the reproductive W agents (W; agents) obttin
an equilibrium payoff of zero. Since some of M; agents are matched with W; agents,
they receive VI regardless of the market supply and demand condition. The payoffs to
productive .M and W agents depend their relative numbers: If the productive W agents
are over-supplied in the spot mmket (m! < w;), their equilibrium payoff is V2 – U1, and the
equilibrium payoffs for productive JWagents are 1 + U1- wz; if the productive ~ agents are
under-supplied (m; < ru~), their equilibrium payoff is 1 – V2, and the equilibrium payoffs
for ,W; agents =e uz.
As in previous sections, type 2 W agents are not involved in first period contracting.
The best terms that a type 2 W agent CSUI offer m M} agent in a fit period contract is Uz
when the ~M#agent turns out to be productive and VI when he is unproductive. However,
~Y M: agent obtfis either I + VI – U2> V2 or U2fmm the second period spot market if
he tu out to be productive, and V, with certainty if he turns out to be unproductive.
10 ~ote ~ha~ ~h~ kind of payoff indeterminmY js not prent with the previous SpeclficatiOn Ofthe JOint
output matrix.
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period contract with a type z w agent.
The general specification of the joint output matrix brings in some new considerations
to the ualysis. Any first period contract between an ,Vf,] agent and a W; agent specifies
the division of the joint output in two contingencies, when the iM} agent [urns out to be
productive and when he is unproductive. Since risk-sharing between the .M? agent and
the W; agent must be optimal in the m~kec equilibrium, the terms of the contract in the
two contingencies are not independent. Suppose the tirst period contract specifies r and
s as the payoffs to the M,l agent in the fist period contract when he is productive and
when he is unproductive respectively. Payoffs to the W~ agent in the two contingencies
are 1 – r and Uz – s respectively. Since payoffs to che W; agent must be non-negative,
r s 1 and s s v, In the appendix (Lemma A.3) we establish that s can be written m a
(weakly) incre~ing, piecewise differential function of r.
The ask and bid price fmctions can be dehed u before: For any fied iT6 [0,1] and
i = 1, 2, rlrn(~) is the solution to the equation
AIU(r) + (1 – Aj)U(S(r)) = A;[r?U(l + VI – U2) + (1 – ‘) U(V2)] +(1 – ‘i)”(vl),
and r:(r) is the solution to the equation
Note that s(r) represents the payoff to the JM} agent when he is unproductit-e w a function
of his payoff when he turns out to be productive.
A comparison of the two uk price functions reveals that the ~k price function of type
1 M agents may be either below or above that of type 2. For a given irl a greater J tends CO
incresse the ask price because the agent h= a higher probability of being productive and
hence a higher expected utility from wtiting), but at the same time it tends to decrease
the ask price because the agent hm greater probability of obtaiting the better terms r,
rather than s(r, ). One can show that if VI is close to V2, the second tendency dominates
md the ask price function of type 1 M agent lies below the type 2 ask price function.
Since the bid price function for type 1 M agent Ii= above the bid price function for type ?
-2i’ -(because A1> ~z), the order of unraveling is presemed lvhen VI is close to vz: There must
be complete unraveling of type 1 M agents before any unraveling of type 2 JM agents, The
monotonicity property of T(yl, yz) established in section 3 clearly remains valid in this
more general assignment m~ket. With these two properties, different types of unraveling
equilibria can be established in a similar way ss in section 3.
-28-Appendix
Lemma Al. For e~h I = 1,2, r~(n) md r,w(fi) are increasing in n For any m 6 (O, 1), r~(r) < r,w(r).
r:(0) =r~(0) =0 andr~(l)=r; (l) = 1.
Proof. By the detinitiona of r? and r:, we have
(1 -T+ Aiff)U(,~(T))= (1 - ~)U(0) + ~17U(l),
(1 -T+ A,~)U(l - r~(7r)) = Ai7U(0)+ (1 - ~) U(l),
and thus r~ (m) and r? (r) are incre-tig functlom of m. Dirmt inspection of the above two equatiom
revealsthat r~(0) = r~(0) = Oand r:(l) = r,~(l) = 1. Taking derivative with respect to T, we have
drrn(m) Ai[U(l) - U(0)]
u’(r,~(ff))+ =
(l-~+~i~)z’
drw(m) A,[u(l) – u(o)]
u’(1 - r~(n))~ =
(1 - ~+Ai~)2
Therefore,
dr?(o) _ Ai[.(1) - .(0)], ~ = u(1) - u(o)
dr u’(o) dm Aiu’(1) ‘
~= Ai[.(1) - U(0)] ~ = u(l) – u(o)
d~ u’(l) ‘ dm Ai.’(O)
Since u and u are concave, (u(l) - u(0)) /u’(0) <1 and (u(1) – u(0)) /u’(1) >1, (u(1) – .(0)) /.’(0) <1
and (u(l) - u(0)) /u’(1) > 1. Therefore, we have dr,m(0)/dn < dr:(0)/dm and dr,m(l)/dn > dr,Y(l)/dr.
Stice u and u are conttiuously d~erentiable, there k fi( such that dr~(m)/dn < dr: (m)/dm for all r < n:
and dr~(~i)/d~ = dr: (~i)/d~. Then, [or all fi > mj,
~= Ai[U(l) - U(0)] A,[u(l) – u(o)]
d~ u’(r~(m))(l - T + AiT)~ > u~(r,m(rl))(l – fi+~,n)z
Ai[U(l) - U(0)] Ai[lJ(l) - u(o)] .
u’(r~(l - 71’i))(l -7 + A,7?)2 > u~(r,~(l - T))(1 - ~+ Aim)z
Since r~(0) = r~(0) = O and r~(l) = r:(l) = 1, r~(n) do= not inte=t r~(r) (or all r c (O, 1), and
r,m(~) < r:(fi).
Q.E.D.
Lemma A.2. For all r E (O,1),
(1 - Al)mu(o) + [1 -(1 - A,)7r]”(l -r~(~)) > (1- Az)mu(0)+[l –(1 –Az)n]u(l –r~(r)).
-29-Proof. Given any T E (O, 1), let
V(Ai) = (1 -A, )Tu(0)+[l -(1 – A,)n]u(l –r:(n))
be the expected utility fOr W} agents frOm first period cOntracts with :~} agents at price r,m(~). Given
m, we can think of V(A) u a function of A given by
V(A) = (1 - A)7ru(0) + [1 – (1 – A)fi]u(l - r“’(~)),
where rm (A) k a function of A delined by
(1 - fi+~fi)u(rm(~)) =(1 - T)u(0) + }nu(l).
The statement of tbe lemma rollows if we can show that V(A) is incre=ing in A. By the detinit,on of V(A),
dV(A)/dA = m[u(l - r“’(~)) - u(O)] – (1 – m+ Jx)u’(1 - r“’(A))dr”’(A)/dA.
By the defiition of rm(~),
drm(A)/dA = [“(1)- U(o)]n(l-m)
u’(rm(~))(l - r+ An)2
Combining the above expr-ions, we iind that dV(A)/dA >0 if and only if
U(I – rm(A)) – u(o) > U(l – r~(A)) - u(o) l–m
u’(1 - rm(~)) u’(rm(~)) l–m+Ar”
By the debition of rm(A), we have
~_lm-:Am [“(1 - ,“’(A)) - “(o)]= .(1) - u(rm(A)).
Thus, dV(A)/dA >0 if and only if
u(1 – rm(A)) - u(O) > u(l) – u(r’’’(l))
U((1 – r~(A)) u~(rm(~))
Since u and u are concave, the Ieft-hnnd side of the above inequality is greater than 1- rm(~) while the
right-hand side is 1= than 1 - rm(A). This complet= the proof of the lemma.
Q.ED.
Lemma A.3. There mists c E (O, 1- w) ad ~ E (UZ,1) m“th c < ~ SU~ that in MY OPtim~ r~k-shming
arrangement, s = Oif r E [0, ~, s = ~ if r G [i, 1], and
“ Ut(r) u’(1 - r) —. —
UI(9) U’(U2 - s)
ifr C (1,7).
Proof. Let c be the solution to the equation
u’(r) W’(1– r) _. —
Ul(o) u’(n)
Since the left-hand-side of the above equation is greater than tbe right-hand-side when r = O and the
o,p~alte M tme when r = 1 - ~, and since the Ieft-hmd-side is decre=ing in r and the rlght-hand-
slde & incre=ing in r, the above equatiOn defin= a unique c G (0, 1 - m). simil~ly, the equatlOn
u~(r) /u’(m) = UJ(l - r)/v’ (0) defin- a unique F E (%, 1). Note that by definition I < F. Otherwi=,
u’(o) U’(d < *_ , u’(n) —. —
u’(n) Ul(l -~ Uf(l -q v’(o)
raulting in a contmdiction.
Suppose r E [0, ~. If J >0, we would have
u)(r) >*= u’(1 – ~ > u’(1 – r) — —
u’(s) u’(o) U’(V2) U’(m - s)
This impli- that the two agents in the contrmt can he made better off if r is incre~ed slightly and s
d-red slightly, a contradiction. Thus, s = Oif r 6 [0, ~. By a symmetric reasoning, s = q if r E [F, 1].
If r c (~ ~, the fi~t-order condition that m optimal risk-sharing arrangement must satisfy leads the
relatlon stated in the lemma.
Q.E.D.
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Figure 1. Ask and bid price functions without reentry.
Figure 2. Ask and bid price runctiom when Aa incre=-1/
n-








Figure 4. Ask and bid price functions with reentry.